### 50 States

#### Lack of reprocessing permission hurts relations – viewed by SK as a matter of national sovereignty.

Manyin, et al., 12[Mark (Coordinator and Specialist in Asian Affairs at CRS); Emma Chanlett-Avery (Acting Section Research Manager at CRS); and Mary Nitkin (Specialist in Nonproliferation at CRS), “U.S.-South Korea Relations”, Congressional Research Service, 5-15-12, RSR]

The current U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation agreement, as with other standard agreements, 66 requires U.S. permission before South Korea can reprocess U.S.-origin spent fuel, including spent fuel from South Korea’s U.S.-designed reactors. 67 This is because reprocessing can create new fuel or plutonium for weapons use. The issue has become a sensitive one for many South Korean officials and politicians, who see it as a matter of national sovereignty. The United States has been reluctant to grant such permission due to concerns over the proliferation potential of this technology, the potential impact on negotiations with North Korea, and the possible contradiction with global nonproliferation policy to prevent enrichment and reprocessing plants in new states.

### Oil DA

#### **Saudi Arabia won’t flood the market**

**DOW JONES 2008** (“Saudi Fears of High Oil Prices Fade With Demand,” May 5, http://snuffysmithsblog.blogspot.com/2008\_04\_06\_archive.html)

Saudi Arabia is the world's only true custodian of spare capacity. The kingdom is currently pumping a little over 9 million barrels a day, according to Dow Jones Newswires estimates. No More 'Good Sweatings'? If the fear of high prices is one of the defining axioms of the oil market psyche of the recent past, then the nature of Saudi influence is also being redefined. While spare capacity still gives Saudi Arabia unique power to sway the market, the structural shift in global energy demand limits its ability to conceivably push oil prices down to historic lows. This shift towards a higher price floor creates openings for competing energy sources. Saudi Arabia's role in the global oil market has sometimes been likened to the Federal Reserve, calibrating its output depending on market signals. Critical to this unique standing has been Saudi maintenance of a cushion of "spare capacity," now estimated at about two million barrels a day. For much of the recent period, the kingdom has refrained from tapping into all or most of its spare capacity.

#### Oil prices drive Russian inflation.

Telegraph 11 (4-5, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/business/8429136/High-oil-prices-a-mixed-blessing-as-Russias-inflation-soars.html)

Driven up by oil and food prices, inflation in Russia this year posted a post-Soviet record high of over 10pc, says Ben Aris¶ Russia’s economy took a hit at the start of this year, raising fears that the recovery is starting to splutter and could reverse as inflation rises.¶ From the top down, Russia looks in great shape thanks to oil prices that have passed the $100 per barrel mark. High oil prices are, of course, good news for the Kremlin. Growth in GDP is coming back nicely and will clearly exceed the state’s official 4pc growth estimate for this year. The budget deficit is falling fast, total foreign investment is almost back to pre-crisis levels, and oil revenues are starting to be siphoned off to rebuild the Reserve Fund again this year, after much of the fund was used to bail out the economy during the recent crash.¶ But from the bottom up the economy looks less good. The one black cloud in otherwise sunny skies is inflation, which is being driven up by food and oil prices. Inflation fell to a post-Soviet low of 5.5pc in July 2010, but in the first few months of this year rose to an annualised rate of well over 10pc. The Central Bank has already reversed its growth-supporting loose monetary policy and started to increase rates again.¶ Rising prices cause pain. Retail sales were recovering strongly at the end of 2010, but then plummeted in January. “These companies had stellar results in the last months of last year but then sales dropped off a cliff at the start of this year,” said Daniel Thorniley, founder of DT Global Business Consulting, adviser to most of the biggest fast-moving consumer goods companies. “Clearly the demand is not stable.”¶ Oil has brought macroeconomic relief, but sustainable growth depends on domestic demand, which is spluttering. Oil exports account for about a third of GDP and commodity prices are volatile, whereas consumption already makes up 52pc of GDP. Once consumer spending restarts, shopping, not oil, becomes the stable and long-term driver of growth.¶ And Russian consumer confidence took a hit in January when an increase in real disposable income of 3.5pc actually turned into a 5.5pc decrease. With less cash to spend, consumers pulled back and nearly every retail statistic fell as a result. Still, these results are not a death sentence for the recovery and could be just the “funny numbers” from January, a month almost the entire population takes off thanks to the holiday-rife Russian Orthodox Church calendar.

### Elections

#### No war – China won’t risk it all and no flashpoints.

Bremmer, President of the Eurasia Group, ‘10

[Ian, “Gathering Storm: America and China in 2020”, July/August 2010, World Affairs Journal,

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JulyAugust/full-Bremmer-JA-2010.html]

In addition, **Beijing has no incentive to mount a global military challenge to U.S. power.** China will one day possess a much more substantial military capacity than it has today, but **its economy has grown so quickly over the past two decades, and its living standards improved so dramatically, that it is difficult to imagine the kind of catastrophic, game-changing event that would push Beijing to risk it all** by posing the West a large-scale military challenge. **It has no incentive to allow anything less than the most serious threat to its sovereignty to trigger a military conflict that might sever its expanding network of commercial ties with countries all over the world—and with the U**nited **S**tates, **the E**uropean **U**nion, **and Japan, in particular. The more familiar flash points are especially unlikely to spark a hot war: Beijing is well aware that no U.S. government will support a Taiwanese bid for independence, and China need not invade an island that it has largely co-opted already, via an offer to much of Taiwan’s business elite of privileged access to investment opportunities on the mainland.**

#### Romney will win – prediction of trend between now and election day

Trende 9/20 (Sean, Senior Elections Analyst for RealClearPolitics, Part 2: Why Romney Wins, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/09/20/state\_of\_the\_race\_part\_2\_why\_romney\_wins\_115513-2.html)

But if we look at the data a different way, we realize that Obama has to pull off some unprecedented feats of his own if he hopes to win. The September time frame is a bit tricky for comparison purposes, because the incumbent party convention occurred in mid-August until 2004. So a challenger who trailed his opponent in September was doing so after the convention bounces had pretty much settled.¶ So let’s instead use data that Nate Silver has helpfully compiled identifying where candidates stood a given number of weeks before and after a convention, regardless of when that convention occurred. Table 1 shows the incumbent party’s lead in the polls two weeks after its convention -- roughly where we are today -- and the ultimate result. Years with incumbents are in boldface:¶ As you can see, no incumbent party has ever held on to the White House while leading by fewer than four points two weeks after its convention; no incumbent president has ever won re-election while leading by fewer than five points (more on the 2004 comparisons later). In other words, winning under these circumstances would be unprecedented (note also that Ronald Reagan was actually tied with Jimmy Carter in a simple poll average at this point in 1980).¶ Perhaps an even better way to look at this is Table 2:¶ This lists the races where incumbent presidents sought re-election since 1968. It then shows how those races broke between two weeks after the incumbent president’s convention and Election Day. On average, they moved 3.7 points toward the challenger (positive numbers indicate movement in that direction; negative numbers show movement toward the incumbent). If you eliminate 1976, as Cohn suggests (since Jerry Ford was a pseudo-incumbent), the average movement is six points toward the challenger.¶ Indeed with the exception of 1992 -- a difficult race from which to draw conclusions given Ross Perot’s on-again/off-again participation in the race -- every contest with an incumbent has broken at least three points toward the challenging party from this point in the race through Election Day.¶ And given the frequent comparisons to 2004, it’s worth bearing in mind where that race stood at this point. George Bush led by 6.8 points as opposed to Barack Obama’s current 2.9 percent. His bounce peaked at 50.4 percent, as opposed to Obama’s 49 percent. If Obama continues to run behind Bush on either metric by similar margins through Election Day, he loses.